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MINDING THE GAP: SEEKING AUTISM COVERAGE IN
CLASS ACTIONS WHEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS FAIL
DANIELLE M. JAFFEE*
***
This Note examines the recent trend towards class actions to challenge
insurers’ denial of autism treatment coverage. The author examines how
state and federal laws regarding insurance coverage of autism treatment
creates a gap allowing insurers to deny coverage, even in spite of the
overwhelming proof of the beneficial nature of autism treatment for autistic
individuals. Past individual challenges of insurers’ actions gave
little guidance to consumers about the legal obligations of insurers for
autism treatment and recent collective action has done little to provide
more. The author examines the decisions of three courts determining the
certification of class challenges to insurers' denials, and proffers how
consumers can successfully challenge insurers' practices in class actions
moving forward.
***
I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently one in sixty-eight children in the United States is
diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, a number that continues to
increase nearly seventeen percent each year.1 These growing numbers have
put increasing pressure on insurance companies to determine what, if any,
coverage they provide for individuals living with autism and even more
pressure on governments to enact laws ensuring assistance for thousands of
citizens.2 The pressures and actions of insurers, though plentiful, have left a
*

University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; American
University, B.A. 2008. I would like to thank Professor Alexandra Lahav for her
guidance and insight as I developed this Note. I am also sincerely grateful to my
family for their many years of love and support.
1
Autism Has High Costs to U.S. Society, HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH
(Apr. 25, 2006), http://archive.sph.harvard.edu/press-releases/2006-releases/press
04252006.html [hereinafter High Costs]; CDC Estimates 1 in 68 Children has
Been Identified with Autism Spectrum Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (March 27, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014 /p0327autism-spectrum-disorder.html.
2
See generally Insurance Coverage for Autism, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/autism-
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clear gap of coverage for autism treatment in the self-insured market. With
no federal or state laws to fall back on, individuals are often forced to turn
to the legal system for assistance. While individual claims for autism
treatment have been brought before the courts for over twenty years, a
recent trend towards class actions has painted an unclear picture of the
rights of the insured to challenge insurers and the ability of courts to allow
class challenges in an area generally considered one of individual review
by insurance companies.
This Note examines the recent movement toward class action
lawsuits against health insurance providers to ensure coverage for autism
treatment. Part II reviews what autism is, its growing prevalence in the
United States, and its treatment. Part III provides a brief overview of state
and federal laws regarding insurance coverage of autism treatment and why
it leaves the door open for courtroom battles. Part IV examines past
individual legal challenges for coverage that set the stage for current class
actions. Part V discusses several recent claims for coverage through class
action lawsuits and the vastly different and contradictory rulings district
courts issued regarding class certification. Part VI compares the class
actions and how the divergent court rulings fail to provide a legal bridge for
the autism coverage gap created by federal and state laws. Finally, part VII
looks to establish an approach to determine class certification for future
class action filings on autism coverage in light of the confusing precedent.
II.

AUTISM: WHAT IT IS, HOW TO TREAT IT, AND ITS
GROWING PREVALENCE IN AMERICA

Autism is a developmental disease that is being diagnosed at
increasing rates in America. It is generally held that early intervention and
treatment of autism helps children better develop, however, disputes
frequently arise between individuals, heath care providers, and insurers as a
result of the nature of treatment championed for autistic children.

and-insurance-coverage-state-laws.aspx [hereinafter NCSL]; Essential Health
Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-healthbenefits/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014); Preventative Care, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/preventive-care/index.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2014).
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A. AUTISM, THE DISEASE
The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
defines autism as a complex developmental disability that results in
problems with social interactions and communication.3 Autism manifests
itself in individuals differently and thus there are varying diagnoses that
require different levels and amounts of therapy.4 Combined, “classic”
autism, Asperger syndrome, and atypical autism (often diagnosed as
Pervasive Developmental Disorder) are part of the Autism Spectrum
Disorder5 (ASD).6
Autism usually emerges in a child before the age of three and is
diagnosable under the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM-IV).7
Although at one time it was believed that autism was a product of
nurture rather than nature, recent research has shown a clear link between
autism and genetics. Several studies which examined familial relationships
and autism diagnoses show that in families where one child has been
diagnosed with autism there is an increased likelihood that a second child
in the family will also be diagnosed with autism.8 While studies continue to
shed light on certain factors that increase the risk of autism, including birth

3

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): Condition Information, NAT’L INST. OF
CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEV. (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.nichd.nih.gov/
health/topics/autism/conditioninfo/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter NICHD].
4
Id.
5
For purposes of this Note, the use of the term autism will encapsulate all
Autism Spectrum Disorders.
6
NICHD, supra note 3.
7
Facts, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/facts.html;
Diagnostic Criteria, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/hcp-dsm.html;
THE DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, §299.00 (Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n 4th ed.) (1994).
8
Two studies have shown that parents who have a child diagnosed with ASD
have a 2-18% chance of having a second child diagnosed with ASD; while other
studies have shown an increased diagnosis rate of 36-95% in identical twins when
one child is diagnosed with ASD. Research, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 19, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/
ncbddd/autism/research.html#howmany.
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to older parents9 and children with certain genetic or chromosomal
conditions,10 there is still much unknown about what causes autism.
Currently, the CDC is conducting a multi-year study to identify additional
factors linked to autism diagnoses.11
B. THE GROWING PREVALENCE OF AUTISM
In the last forty years the diagnoses of autism in the United States
have increased substantially. In 1975 the prevalence of autism diagnoses
per person was 1 in 5,000; in 1985 it increased to 1 in 2,500 and in 1995 it
reached 1 in 500.12 Since 2001 the number has increased from 1 in 250 to 1
in 68 in 2014.13 Autism is now more common than Down syndrome or
childhood cancer.14 Autism diagnosis trends also show a bigger impact on
males. The current diagnosis rates reflect boys are five times more likely
to be diagnosed with autism than girls.15
Currently, over 1.5 million Americans are diagnosed with autism.
While the number is alarming, more alarming is that the rate of individuals
diagnosed with autism is growing 10-17% per year, meaning in five years
the number of individuals in America diagnosed with autism could be
larger than the population of New Hampshire.16
9

Maureen S. Durkin et al., Advanced Parental Age and the Risk of Autism
Spectrum Disorder, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1268, 1268 (2008), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2638544/pdf/kwn250.pdf.
10
Data and Statistics, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/
autism/data.html [hereinafter Data and Statistics].
11
SEED, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/seed.html.
12
AUTISM SPEAKS, SELF-FUNDED EMPLOYER TOOL KIT 22, available at
http://www.autismspeaks.org/sites/default/files/docs/gr/erisa_tool_kit_9.12_0.pdf
[hereinafter Employer Toolkit].
13
CDC Estimates 1 in 68 Children has Been Identified with Autism Spectrum
Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (March 27, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0327-autism-spectrum-disorder.html.
14
Geoffrey Cowley, Understanding Autism, NEWSWEEK (July 30, 2000, 5:20
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/understanding-autism-161485.
15
Boys are diagnosed at a rate of 1 in 54 while girls are diagnosed at a rate of
1 in 252. Data and Statistics, supra note 10.
16
High Costs, supra note 1; New Hampshire QuickFacts from the US Census
Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 16, 2014), http://quickfacts.census.gov
/qfd/states/33000.html.
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C. TREATING AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS
Much of the discussion pertaining to insurance coverage for autism
centers on insurance companies covering the treatment expenses that a
family incurs as a result of the diagnosis. Because autism is a
developmental disorder, the treatment of the disease focuses on not only
medication, but additionally, social skills, communication, speech therapy,
and sensory integration training.17 Such therapies are often deemed by
insurance companies to be either educational or experimental,18 thus
eliminating their burden to provide coverage because insurance policies
exclude “experimental” and “educational” treatments as terms of their
contract.19
The key to treatment for autism comes from research establishing
that early intervention can dramatically improve a child’s development and
therefore children with autism are encouraged to begin receiving services
between birth and three years of age.20 Thus, the bulk of expenses for
autism treatment come between the first few years of life when children are
undergoing intensive treatment programs to ensure steady development.
The most notable form of treatment and the central issue at hand in
the pending class actions against insurers is Applied Behavioral Analytics
(ABA). ABA is defined as “the science in which tactics derived from the
principles of behavior are applied systematically to improve socially
significant behavior and experimentation is used to identify the variables
responsible for behavior change.”21 ABA therapy is a highly structured
one-on-one coaching led by a certified instructor in which a child engages
17

Treatment, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/treatment.html
[hereinafter Treatment].
18
Insurance companies commonly provide themselves a loophole that allows
them to deny a request for coverage of experimental treatments, favoring instead
that all procedures covered are thoroughly tested and proven effective. See
generally Jim Williams, When Insurers Won’t Pay for Experimental Treatments,
ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131212
&page=1.
19
Angela Barner, Unlocking Access to Insurance Coverage for Autism
Treatment, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 107, 108 (2009).
20
Treatment, supra note 17.
21
Paul Mooney et. al., Behavior Modification/Traditional Techniques for
Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, in 22 BEHAVIORAL
DISORDERS: IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND INSTRUCTION OF STUDENTS WITH
EBD 173, 174 (Jeffrey P. Bakken et al. eds., 2012).
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in positive reinforcement exercises targeting areas such as language, play,
learning, and real-life functioning.22 Studies and advocates strongly
encourage the use of ABA treatment in the early stages of life to ensure
proper development for children with autism, often stating that if a child
receives ABA therapy early there is a strong likelihood that the child will
eventually be able to attend regular classes.23
Behavior analysis treatment for children with autism started in the
1960s when Ivar Lovaas and others at the University of California, Los
Angeles, conducted a study amongst forty children diagnosed with autism
and subjected them to various amounts of behavior analysis treatment.24
The original study showed a substantial improvement in individuals that
underwent forty hours of one-on-one ABA treatment, many of whom were
successfully mainstreamed into a regular classroom.25 Further studies have
also shown that ABA therapy results in long and short-term gains in
intellectual function and educational progress.26
In 1999, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
issued a report of the Surgeon General on mental health showing
substantial support for ABA therapy and its proven efficacy.27 Then again
in 2001, the U.S. Surgeon General’s report on mental health further
corroborated these findings, asserting that ABA therapy minimizes socially
unacceptable behavior while increasing socially appropriate behavior,
communication skills, and learning abilities for children with autism.28
As a result of years of toting the advantages of ABA therapy, most
autistic children participate in the intensive program. Generally, the
treatment is administered for thirty to forty hours a week for three to four
years, costing families several thousands of dollars.

22

Iver Peterson, High Rewards and High Costs As States Draw Autistic
Pupils,
N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/06/
nyregion/high-rewards-and-high-costs-as-states-draw-autisticpupils.html?page
wanted=all&src=pm.
23
Barner, supra note 19, at 110; Peterson, supra note 22.
24
Beth Rosenwasser & Saul Axelrod, The Contributions of Applied Behavior
Analysis to the Education of People with Autism, 25 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 671,
672 (October 2001), available at http://bmo.sagepub.com/content/25/5/671.
25
Id. at 672.
26
Barner, supra note 19, at 111.
27
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 163-64 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/
ps/access/NNBBHS.pdf.
28
Barner, supra note 19, at 111.
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D. THE COSTS OF TREATMENT: HEAVY BURDENS ON FAMILIES AND
STATES BUT POCKET CHANGE FOR INSURERS
In 2006, Harvard released a report by Michael Ganz, MS, PhD that
examined the growing costs of autism coverage on individuals, families,
and society.29 The report found that it costs society $35 billion annually to
care for individuals with autism and $3.2 million for an individual to cover
their own care over a lifetime.
Further, Ganz and other studies have found, individuals with
autism incur twice as many expenses for care as the typical American in
their lifetime. Reports have shown that it can total up to $81,900 for a
family to provide adequate treatment to a child with autism, including
speech therapy, occupational therapy, and ABA treatment.30 A child with
autism will incur 2.5 times more outpatient costs and 2.9 times more
inpatient costs in their lifetime than an individual without autism.31 These
costs only increase if an individual’s insurance company fails to cover even
some of the treatment.
Ganz’s report also examined the cost to society as a whole for
autism. These figures considered the effect of autism on both individuals
with the disease and their family/caregivers. Considerations included the
lower level of employment procured by autistic individuals, including
decreased pay and benefits, as well as lower savings value due to increased
expenses for medical treatment, therapies, and special programing
requirements.32 The study also accounted for the loss or impairment of
work time for family members of autistic individuals, including missed
work, reduced hours, lower-paying jobs with more flexible requirements,
or leaving the workforce entirely to care for their autistic family member.33
While the numbers for individuals and families coping with autism
are often staggering and equivalent to an individual’s annual income, the
cost for insurers is far less. The Council for Affordable Health Insurance
(CAHI) released information in 2009 claiming that an autism mandate,
29

See generally Michael L. Ganz, The Lifetime Distribution of the Incremental
Societal Costs of Autism, 161 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 343
(2007).
30
Laura C. Hoffman, Ensuring Access to Health Care for the Autistic Child:
More is Needed Than Federal Health Care Reform, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 435, 437
(2012).
31
Id.
32
Ganz, supra note 29, at 348.
33
Id. at 344.
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legislation that requires health insurers to cover autism treatment, only
increases the cost of health insurance by about 1%.34 CAHI cautions that
the cost could increase if more services are mandated, but they still
estimate only a one to three percent increase.35
Further, in the absence of insurance coverage, many families that
cannot carry the financial burden of treatment expenses move their children
into the Medicaid system, which may cover autism treatment at a higher
rate than private insurers. Medicaid coverage is often superior to private
insurance because state Medicaid programs offer some level of mental
health services coverage and reimbursement,36 while private insurance may
not.
With nearly 50% of Medicaid beneficiaries suffering from
diagnosable mental health disorders in a given year,37 the pressure to keep
citizens with access to private health insurance out of the state Medicaid
programs is growing. The more individuals with medical conditions that
the Medicaid system absorbs, the greater financial burden placed on a state
to finance the expanding costs of the program, an even heavier burden with
many states struggling from significant state budget deficits.
III.

WHAT THE LAWS SAY AND WHY IT IS A BATTLE FOR
COVERAGE

Over the last few decades autism coverage proponents have
experienced a number of victories in the quest to ensure coverage.
However, even in light of moves by both the federal and state governments,
efforts have fallen short of reaching millions of Americans, most notably
those covered by employer-sponsored health plans.38

34

Victoria C. Bunce, The Growing Trend Toward Mandating Autism
Coverage, 152 COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS. ISSUES & ANSWERS (Mar.
2009), available at www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/n152AutismTrend.
pdf.
35
Id.
36
Mental Health Services, MEDICAID.GOV,http://www.medicaid.gov/ Medic
aid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Mental-Health-Services-.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
37
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH IS ESSENTIAL TO HEALTH: PREVENTION WORKS,
TREATMENT IS EFFECTIVE, PEOPLE RECOVER, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 1, 7, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ partnerships/
aca_act_and_community/aca_behavioralhealth.pdf.
38
Employer Toolkit, supra note 12, at 33.
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A. FEDERAL
The work on the federal level to guarantee autism coverage has
been spotty at best. The federal government has made broad strokes in an
attempt to make mental illness and behavioral treatment a staple of health
plan coverage. However, while these efforts are admirable, each one falls
short of truly providing coverage for such ailments.
At the forefront of autism coverage is the Mental Health Parity
Act, originally passed by Congress in 1996 and amended to fix certain
loopholes in 2008.39 Together the laws require group health plans to
establish financial requirements and treatment limits for mental health and
substance abuse services that are no less restrictive than the requirements
and limitations imposed on medical and surgical benefits.40 Mental Health
Parity impacts autism coverage in that the DSM, which serves as the basis
for the definition of mental health ailments for both laws and insurers,
clearly classifies autism as a mental health disorder. The problem with the
act as it is structured is that it does not require mental health benefits
coverage; it simply states that if, and only if, a health plan already covers
mental health, such benefits shall be no less restrictive. This in turn leaves
the option open for health insurers to simply not offer mental health
coverage to avoid being subject to such regulations.
Another federal attempt at providing mental health coverage, and
specifically autism coverage, to citizens can be found in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). First, section 1302(b) of the
ACA requires all individual and small group plans to provide coverage for
“essential benefits.”41 Originally the Secretary of Health and Human
Services was slated to establish a list of required essential benefits that each
state must use as their minimum requirements, giving autism advocates
hope that treatment would be covered under the mental health and
behavioral health treatment category of “essential benefits.”42 However, in
December 2011, the administration announced the intention that each state
would be free to create their own list of “essential benefits” to serve as the
39

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006).
Id.
41
CENTER FOR CONSUMER AND INSURANCE OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVS., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 1-2 (2011),
available at https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/ essential
_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf.
42
See generally AUTISM SPEAKS, COVERAGE OF AUTISM SERVICES UNDER THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS PACKAGE (Oct. 11, 2011).
40
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benchmark for all small and individual plans sold within the state.43
Resulting from the state flexibility approach, only eleven states deemed
autism treatment coverage an essential benefit in their benchmark plans.44
Second, section 1001(5) of the ACA requires small group and
individual health plans to provide preventative care services at no cost to
the insured.45 As established by the Department of Health and Human
Services, based in part on the recommendation and scoring of the U.S.
Preventative Services Task Force, autism screenings for children aged
eighteen to twenty-four months are considered a mandatory preventative
service.46
While the efforts of ACA will undoubtedly help provide coverage
to many individuals, it still falls short of reaching the growing number of
plans that are just outside of the federal regulations. Large group plans are
specifically exempt in the language of the ACA.47 Any employer-sponsored
plan or individual health plan that was established prior to the passing of
the ACA is deemed grandfathered, and thus protected from such
requirements so long as they maintain grandfather status, which, for many,
will be several years.48 Self-funded benefit plans are regulated by the

43

Christine Vestal & Matt McKillop, Health Law Explained: The States Gain
New Flexibility in Setting Policies, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/health-law-explained-thestates-gain-new-flexibility-in-setting-policies-85899375384.
44
Christine Vestal, Q&A: How ACA Will Affect People With Autism, THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/
stateline/headlines/qa-how-aca-will-affect-people-with-autism-85899496217.
45
See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012) (codifying § 1001(5) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)).
46
What Are My Preventative Care Benefits?, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive-care-benefits/#part=3
(last
visited Dec. 17, 2013).
47
Sarah Barr, FAQ: Grandfathered Health Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/december/
17/ grandfathered-plans-faq.aspx.
48
The law is structured to remove grandfathered status once a plan makes
“significant” changes that result in increased costs or decreased benefits to
participants. This caveat ensures that inevitably most, if not all, plans will comply
with the ACA requirements. Current studies state that the number of individuals
covered by grandfathered plans has begun to steadily decline and will continue
downward in the coming years. Current numbers show that 48% of those covered
by their employers are enrolled in grandfathered plans in 2012, down from 54% in
2011. Id.
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act and exempt from all
requirements described above under federal law.
B. STATE
In the absence of comprehensive requirements on the federal level
for autism coverage, many states have taken it upon themselves to
implement legislation requiring insurers to cover autism. Indiana passed
the first meaningful piece of autism coverage legislation in 2001. The law
requires individual and group insurance plans to provide coverage for the
treatment of pervasive developmental disorders, including autism, that have
been prescribed by an individual’s treating physician.49
It was not until several years later that the movement to require
autism coverage took hold and laws began appearing in several states.
Currently thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have laws that
address autism coverage, with the bulk of states adopting such legislation
in the last four to five years.50
The content of autism coverage laws varies from state to state, with
thirty-one states specifically requiring insurers to provide for the treatment

49

IND. CODE §§ 27-8-14.2-3, 27-8-14.2-4, 27-8-14.2-5 (2013).
Nine states adopted laws in the 2007-2008 legislative session, eight states in
the 2009 legislative session, nine states in the 2010 legislative session, six states in
2011, and three states in 2012. NCSL, supra note 2; ALA. CODE § 27-54A-2
(2013); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.397 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-826.04,
20-1057.11, 20-1402.03, 20-1404.03 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-418 (2013);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1374.72, 1374.73 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. §
10-16-104 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3366 (2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 627.6686,
641.31098 (2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.5/356Z.14 (2013); IND. CODE §§ 27-814.2, 27-13-7-14 (2013); IOWA CODE § 514C.28 (2013); KAN. STATE. ANN. § 766524 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 304.17A-142, 143 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22:1050 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 2768 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. IV §§ 32A-22, 25 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1416e (2013);
MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1224 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-515, 33-22-706
(2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0435, 689B.0335 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
417-E:1-2 (2013); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 17:48-6ii, 17:48-A-7ff, 17B:26-2.1cc,
17B:27-46.lii, 17B:27A-7.16, 17B:27A-19.20 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A22-49, 59A-23-7.9, 59A-46-50, 59A-47-45 (2013); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3216, 3221
(2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27.20.11 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-280 (2013);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1355.015 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4088i (2013); VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1:01 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 5-16B-6e (2013); WIS. STAT.
§ 632.895(12m) (2013).
50
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of autism.51 Overall, the laws implemented throughout the country establish
varying annual cap limits on how much an insurer is required to pay out,
from no limit to $50,000 a year, and also varying age limits that an insurer
is required to cover, such as coverage for life or just for the first two to six
years of life.52
While states have made great strides to ensure autism coverage for
their citizens, it should be noted that because of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-emption discussed next, self-insured
plans53 are exempt from these state level requirements. This means that
29% of children aged 0-18 that are covered by self-insured plans might not
have autism coverage.54 While several self-insured plans, such as those
offered by Microsoft, Eli Lilly, and Home Depot, voluntarily provide
autism benefits,55 such actions are not mandated by law and therefore there
is no guarantee as health care expenses rise that these companies will
continue to provide these benefits.
C. ERISA
One of the biggest roadblock to coverage for autism can be found
in ERISA. While efforts have been made on the federal level to establish
requirements of coverage and equal treatment, and even on the state level
to specifically require autism coverage, many plans can still be exempt
from such mandates56 leaving millions57 without a safety net.
ERISA applies to health benefit plans offered in the private
industry, but its most notable impact on health insurance laws comes in its
protection of self-insured plans – or plans where the employer has taken on

51

NCSL, supra note 2.
Employer ToolKit, supra note 12, at 25.
53
The term self-insured plan refers to health benefit plans in which the plan
sponsor, an employer, directly funds the health benefits for its enrollees. In
contrast, fully-insured plans refer to situations in which an employer purchases
group health insurance from an insurer. Michael J. Brien & Constantijin W.A.
Panis, Self-Insured Health Benefit Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 4 (Mar. 23, 2011),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACASelfFundedHealthPlansReport032811.pdf.
54
Employer Toolkit, supra note 12, at 33.
55
Id. at 35.
56
29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006).
57
Employer Health Benefits: 2013 Summary of Findings, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, 1 (Aug. 20, 2013), available at
http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/2013-employer-health-benefits/.
52
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the financial risk of funding, managing, and administering, its health plan.58
Under section 514 of ERISA, self-insured health benefit plans are insulated
from many state insurance laws, specifically state insurance mandates.
While the first clause, section 514(a), establishes the broad preemption
power of ERISA,59 specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the key
term of section 514(a), “relate to,” should be given its “broad commonsense meaning,” so as to displace all state laws that are in connection with,
or making reference, to an employee benefit plan,60 section 514(b)(2)(A),
the “savings clause,” reserves the right of states to regulate insurance
generally.61 Under this provision even if a state law is preempted under
section 514(a) it can still be allowed so long as it regulates insurance, or in
other words, if the state law is “specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance . . . [and] . . . substantially affect[s] the risk pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”62
However, the Deemer clause, section 514(b)(2)(B), establishes the
one exception to the right of states to regulate insurance and is the pinpoint
clause that exempts self-insured from state mandates.63 The Deemer clause
restricts states’ regulation of insurance to only insurance companies and
contracts, not plans themselves. Therefore, a self-insured plan is neither an
insurance company nor a contract, thus exempt from state regulations and
mandates. This loophole created by the ERISA is what allows many plans
to be free from autism treatment requirements, thus creating a gap of
coverage for millions of Americans.

58

Matt Leming, More Employers Weigh Self-Funded Health Plans, SOC’Y
HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.shrm.org/
hrdisciplines/benefits/Articles/Pages/SelfFunded.aspx..aspx.
59
ERISA shall “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. §1144(a).
60
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983).
61
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
62
Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003).
63
This Deemer clause states that no employee benefit plan “shall be deemed
to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of
insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies [or] contracts.” 29 U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(B).
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The inability of federal and state laws to ensure coverage and the
escalating cost of autism treatment has left many struggling for a way to
hold insurers liable for treatment. Some individuals have turned to the
judicial system as a means to require insurers to provide coverage for
treatment. In these individual claims, courts have relied on the insurers
inadequacies to establish individuals’ rights to autism treatment coverage,
stating that insurers’ unsubstantiated rejections of treatment are not enough
to uphold a denial of benefits. However, while several individual cases
exist, none of the courts have established a precedent that would extend
beyond the individuals before them. Each ruling was narrowly tailored to
the case at hand, failing to establish a rule or guideline of when, and if, a
court would require an insurer to provide specific coverage.
The fight for health insurance coverage of autism is no stranger to
the court system. Dating back to the early 1990s, several individual claims
against health insurers have been brought seeking coverage for autism
treatment. Collectively these individual claims show a deference of the
courts to the needs and requirements of individuals over those of health
insurers.
The early predecessor to such claims came in 1990 when Kunin v.
Benefit Trust Life Insurance was heard before the Ninth Circuit.64 Kunin
was covered by an employer health plan, operated by Benefit Trust that
refused to cover his numerous claims. In 1986, Kunin’s son was diagnosed
with autism and underwent thirty days of treatment, which cost over
$54,000.65 The disagreement arose when Benefit Trust stated the policy
only allowed for up to $10,000 for “mental illness or nervous disorders”
reimbursement.66 The insurer held that autism was classified as a mental
illness and therefore Kunin was responsible for costs beyond the
reimbursement maximum.67
In the opinion, the Court held that the classification of autism as a
mental illness was an arbitrary and capricious decision by the insurer
because they failed to substantiate the determination. Specifically, the
Court stated that the so-called expert the insurers relied on for such a
classification had failed to disclose material information, including what
64

Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 535.
66
Id.
67
Id.
65
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other doctors he had consulted or his experience or particular expertise
concerning autism, to establish a well-founded reasoning behind the
determination.68 Further, the Court noted that the insurer had failed to make
any effort to talk with the boy’s own physicians to determine the basis for
diagnosis and the recommended treatment before establishing the
classification.69 In light of these facts and because the policy in question
was vaguely worded as to not contain a definition or explanation of mental
illness, the Ninth Circuit found that the insurer was obligated to pay the full
amount of the claim.70 While the case brought the issue of coverage for
autism treatment to the forefront, the fact that it turned on the definition of
mental illness in the policy language only established a case-specific
holding for an insurer’s liability.
Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the district court for the
Northern District of Illinois again displayed the proclivity of courts to favor
the insured over the insurers in the face of inadequate rationale. In Wheeler
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., the Plaintiff argued that Aetna wrongfully denied
coverage of medical treatment for his son who suffered from numerous
conditions, including autism.71 The majority of the argument centered on
coverage for speech therapy, physical therapy, ABA therapy, and sensory
integration therapy, most of which Aetna refused to cover, citing various
reasons, specifically the lack of evidence that such therapies are effective.72
Aetna argued that it had the right to reject coverage of certain therapies
because the language of the policy granted them discretion to determine “to
what extent employees and beneficiaries are entitled to benefits,” however
the Court rejected this argument, stating that the discretionary decisions of
Aetna must still be reasonable and must provide the insured with “every
reason for [their] denial of benefits at the time of denial.”73
The Court then went on to examine three letters issued by Aetna in
which “they utterly fail to consider the actual language of the plan at
issue,” and thus had failed to provide adequate reasoning for their
rejections.74 The Court found that the actions of Aetna were, in effect,
classifying autism as a developmental disorder which was covered by the
68

Id. at 537-38.
Id. at 538.
70
Id. at 541.
71
Wheeler v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 01 C 6064, 2003 WL 21789029, at *1
(N.D. Ill. July 23, 2003).
72
Id. at *3–4.
73
Id. at *4–7.
74
Id. at *9.
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policy but then subsequently denying all treatment for developmental
delays caused by autism.75 The Court held these actions by the insurer, if
allowed, “[w]ould in effect render the provisions for coverage for autism
meaningless.”76
Although not a traditional individual claim, the Sixth Circuit issued
another judicial opinion showing deference to protecting the rights of
individuals to receive coverage of autism treatment in Parents’ League for
Effective Autism Services v. Jones-Kelly.77 The guardians of three
Medicaid-eligible children filed for a preliminary injunction against Ohio
to prevent the state from implementing amendments that would effectively
stop funding autism treatment.78 After the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) issued proposed rules that would limit Medicaid
coverage for rehabilitative services, Ohio promulgated amendments to its
own Administrative Code, one of which limited coverage by defining
rehabilitative services as those that would restore an individual to their
prior functioning level.79 The new amendments effectively eradicated state
funding to programs that provided autism treatment to Medicaid children.
The lawsuit claimed such actions violate federal Medicaid law that
provides eligible children with such services.80 Plaintiffs in the case argued
that these rules deny funding to facilities responsible for providing autism
treatment to Medicaid-eligible children.81 The Court did not rule on the
merits, but instead granted a temporary restraining order to prevent the
state from implementing the amendments.82 The decisions, although not
conclusive, signaled the judicial system’s hesitance to allow actions that
would eliminate adequate coverage for autism treatment in state-run
Medicaid programs.
It was not until several years after these cases that a district court
would consider the question that currently plagues the class actions for
autism treatment: does an insurer’s designation of ABA therapy as
“experimental” warrant their refusal to cover such treatment under the
terms of their plans? In McHenry v. PacificSource Health Plans, the Court
75

Id. at *13.
Id. at *13.
77
Parents’ League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 339 Fed.
App’x. 542, 542 (6th Cir. 2009).
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Id. at 543.
79
Id. at 545.
80
Id. at 545-46.
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Id. at 551-52.
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Id. at 543-44, 552.
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considered whether an insurance carrier was responsible to an ABA
therapist after a child had been diagnosed with autism and his pediatrician
prescribed ABA therapy.83 After seeing the therapist for four months,
PacificSource denied payment citing its policy that allowed them to deny
coverage for experimental or investigational procedures, as well as
academic or social skills training.84 To support its rejection, PacificSource
stated that there was “no ‘gold standard’ for the treatment of autism, and
there is much debate in the literature regarding the efficacy of any one
approach, including ABA . . . [thus] it [is] clear that ABA [is] not a wellproven or evidence-based standard of medical care.”85
The Court rejected both arguments, holding that ABA is supported
by decades of research and application, and stated that ABA is an
acknowledged autism treatment by several government agencies, including
the Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institute of
Mental Health, and professional organizations, including the American
Psychological Society.86 Further, the court stated that although ABA
treatment may have incidental benefits related to education and social skills
for autistic children, its main focus is modifying behaviors pertinent to
every area of the child’s life and thus not solely an academic or social skills
program.87 In the end, the Court found that ABA therapy was medically
necessary for Wheeler’s autism treatment.88
While the judicial prerogative has been to favor the insured and
coverage for autism treatment, the Court’s failure to rule in a broader
context leaves the critical question of all these claims unanswered: will,
and should, insurers be required to provide coverage of autism treatment to
their insured?

83

McHenry v. PacificSource Health Plans, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228-29 (D.
Or. 2010).
84
Id. at 1228.
85
Id. at 1236.
86
Id. at 1237-38.
87
Id. at 1240-41.
88
Id. at 1248. In the end, the Court ruled against a Motion for Summary
Judgment, stating that a secondary reason for denial of payments based on the
ABA therapists lack of credentialing was enough to support a refusal of
PacificSource to reimburse. Id. at 1245-46.
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THE PRESENT: BANDING TOGETHER TO CHALLENGE
INSURERS FOR AUTISM COVERAGE

After years of individual claims against insurers, a new breed of
cases regarding autism coverage began to appear before the courts. In 2010
and 2011, insured individuals, who had been denied insurance coverage for
ABA, began banding together to challenge their individual carriers. Three
separate claims for class certification were brought before federal courts to
directly challenge their insurer’s denial of coverage for ABA therapy.89 The
carriers stated the same reasoning for denial in all cases: ABA is an
investigative and experimental treatment. The charges of the insured were
the same: the insurance carrier should provide coverage under my policy
for ABA treatment for autism.90 However, the similarities ended there. In
the three cases, often with nearly identical facts, the reasoning of the judges
resulted in very different outcomes for class certification.
The first judge reasoned that the presented class failed to establish
commonality, or failed to establish that there was a common question of
law or fact applicable to the entire class.91 The court reasoned that a claim
for autism treatment would require individualized review of an insured’s
claim and medical treatment to determine if ABA therapy is actually
experimental,92 thus a “determination of [the common question’s] truth or
falsity” would not have resolved the central issue of all claims “in one
stroke.”93 The second judge found no such failure to establish
commonality, and determined that an insurance company’s across the
board determinations regarding ABA therapy meant a common question of
if ABA therapy was a covered benefit existed.94 Further, the judge stated
that even though the entitlement award for the denied benefit might require
individualized review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), such
determinations do not predominate over the common question plaguing all
class members.95 Finally, the third judge found that such classes can easily
be certified under common questions as the court is only seeking to
89

See generally Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84,
2010 WL 670081 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010); Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL 9378789 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011); Churchill
v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011).
90
Id.
91
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); Graddy, 2010 WL 670081, at *9.
92
See Graddy, 2010 WL 670081 at *9.
93
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
94
See Potter, 2011 WL 9378789, at *6.
95
See id.

2014

MINDING THE GAP

617

determine whether the denial of ABA claims are appropriate.96 However,
limitations on relief apply in relation to who composes the class.97 These
rulings create three distinct interpretations of the applicability of class
adjudication of autism claims.
A. GRADDY, 2010
First, in Graddy v. Blue Cross BlueShield of Tennessee Inc, a group
of individuals covered by Blue Cross BlueShield of Tennessee (BCBST)
moved for class certification in a claim against the insurer because of their
denial of coverage for ABA therapy for autistic individuals.98 The Plaintiffs
in the case claimed that the actions of BCBST violated ERISA, the
Tennessee Autism Equity Act, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection
Act. Specifically, the claim stated that BCBST violated its fiduciary duties
to the Plaintiffs when it failed to fairly and properly construe and interpret
the language of the health plans for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to the members of the plan.99 Further, they alleged that the
Tennessee Autism Equity Act required BCBST to provide benefits and
coverage for the treatment of autism at the same level it provided for other
neurological disorders and that it had failed to do so when it rejected the
claims.100 Finally, the Plaintiffs claimed BCBST had engaged in unfair and
deceptive trade practices, violating the Tennessee Consumer Protection
Act.101
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 23(b)(2),
the Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all insured under the BCBST
policy who have, or will make, a claim for coverage for ABA therapy and
96

See Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 12, 2011).
97
See id. at *4–6. In a subsequent amended complaint, Judge Sanchez allowed
a second representative to be added to the class to capture all current Cigna
members who had submitted ABA claims that were subsequently denied under
Cigna’s current company-wide policy. However, in the subsequent case Judge
Sanchez denied the motion to certify a (b)(2) class because the class in its entirety
sought individualized monetary damages, which were not certifiable under (b)(2).
Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2012 WL 3590691, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
21, 2012) [hereinafter Churchill II].
98
Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL
670081, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).
99
Id. at *1-4.
100
Id at *6.
101
Id.
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BCBST denied such coverage on the basis that ABA is deemed
investigative or experimental.102 The class argued that BCBST had
established “a deliberate company-wide policy to deny all claims for ABA
treatment, even though it knows the terms of its Plans provide coverage for
the treatment” and further that such denials were made in bad faith and on
baseless grounds.103
The court rejected class certification on the basis that the class
failed to meet the commonality requirement of FRCP 23(a)(2), requiring
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”104 Here, the
court reasoned, a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA requires
most questions be answered through individualized review of each class
member’s claim, diagnosis, therapy and determination if ABA truly was
experimental for their precise condition.105 Specifically, proving breach of
fiduciary duty requires showing a connection between the fiduciaries
actions and the harm caused to the individual. The court focused on the
varying degrees of autism and how each diagnosis was different. The court
reasoned that, “individuals suffering from . . . autism ‘may exhibit the
characteristic traits of autism . . . in any combination, and in different
degrees of severity,’” and therefore, “the varied behavioral disorders
exhibited by patients with ASD, and the question of whether such behavior
disorders may or may not be treated by ABA,” means that the class shares
no homogeneity that would allow them to operate as a class.106
The court specifically reserved ruling on the merits of the claim
until the complaint could be amended by Graddy to establish an individual
claim against BCBST’s decision to deny coverage for ABA treatment.107
The concluding statements of the court in this opinion showed support for
individual claims of autism coverage against insurers that had been stated
in prior cases as well as the growing policy support found on the state and
federal level for autism coverage, but stopped short of allowing a class
action against an insurer.108
It should be noted that in 2013 the District Court for Oregon
addressed a similar class seeking only injunctive relief and, in contrast to

102

Id. at *4.
Id. at *3, *5.
104
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Graddy, was granted certification.109 In A.F. v. Providence, the Plaintiff
class included all current members of Providence health plans who had
been, or will be up to the time of certification, diagnosed with autism.110
The class sought injunctive relief against Providence to prevent them from
uniformly applying a policy exclusion that excludes all coverage for ABA
therapy.111 After a lengthy discussion of the requirements of a proper class
under Rule 23(a), the judge certified the class finding that “injunction
would provide specific and meaningful relief to all named class
members.”112 Particularly, the judge found that resolving the question
raised by the Plaintiffs would provide “complete relief as to the specific
issue raised by the [class], even if it does not ultimately address every class
members’ needs or issues.”113 While AF is the most recent iteration of the
autism class action, the opinion issued by the court offers little beyond
what has already been expressed in the earlier autism class action court
rulings. The vast majority of the AF opinion focuses on the checklist
requirements of class certification and therefore this author believes it does
not warrant further discussion.
B. POTTER, 2011
In the second class action claim, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan certified a class claim against Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Michigan (BCBSM) and its rejection of ABA treatment for autism.114 In
Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, the class brought suit under
ERISA claiming first, that BCBSM had improperly denied claims on the
basis that ABA is deemed experimental or investigative and second, that
BCBSM had denied them the opportunity for a full and fair review of the
claim.115
Michael Porter, acting as class representative, made a motion to
certify a class containing two subclasses. Subclass A was defined as all
insureds under a BCBSM policy who made a claim, or will make a claim,
109

A.F. v. Providence Health Plan, No. 3:13-CV-00776-SI, 2013 WL 6796095
(D. Or. Dec. 24, 2013).
110
Id. at *4.
111
Id. at *1.
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Id. at *10.
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Id. at *11 (emphasis in original).
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Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL
9378789 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011).
115
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for ABA therapy and the claim was, or will be, denied on grounds that such
treatment is investigative or experimental.116 Subclass B was defined as all
insured under a BCBSM policy who did not make a claim for ABA “in
light of Defendant’s policy that such treatment is deemed to be
investigative or experimental.”117
The court found that the numerosity standard was easily met,
determining that, based on the business size of BCBSM and the number of
students diagnosed with autism in Michigan schools, joinder would be
impractical, if not impossible.118 Further, the class shared a common
question as all of the claims depended on the same contention: there is no
reasonable basis for stating that ABA is experimental and not a mainstream
medical treatment. Therefore all claims of the class would be addressed
when the court determines if the insurer had improperly deemed ABA
treatment experimental.119
It was noted that the area of most difficulty on its face was
determining the members of the class. While subclass A was easily
distinguishable based on the likelihood of BCBSM maintaining records on
claims filed, subclass B would be theoretically difficult because of the
subjective nature of ascertaining why an individual did not file a claim.
However, the court rejected this obstacle, stating that they can assume that
if an individual failed to file a claim for ABA treatment, it was a result of
them either being told, or somehow learning, that BCBSM deemed all such
treatment experimental and excluded from coverage. Therefore, instead of
going through the burden of processing an insurance claim only to have it
rejected, the individual that received ABA treatment and did not submit the
claim did so only because of the BCBSM policy.120
The judge here explicitly disagreed with Graddy, noting that,
although the cases are similar, determining the case would not require
answering individualized questions. BCBSM made an across-the-board
determination that ABA treatment is experimental and therefore not a
covered benefit, thus BCBSM’s determination was not made after
considering each individual claim and medical need, but rather based on its
uniform determination that ABA is experimental.121
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The class was then certified under Rule 23(b)(3) with the
presumption that, since the class claim was that ABA claims were
improperly rejected by BCBSM because of an experimental classification,
no member of this class would have another reason for being rejected by
BCBSM and therefore the class would require no individualized
determination.122 Further, the Court rejected BCBSM’s contention and the
Graddy Court’s reasoning, that individual determinations would be needed
to decipher how much each class member was entitled to under their claim,
explaining that such determinations do not predominate over the common
issue that BCBSM improperly denied their ABA claims.123
C. CHURCHILL, 2011
The third class action, filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
came to a very different conclusion than the other two courts. In Churchill
v. Cigna Corp., the Court differed from Graddy by choosing to certify a
class action against an insurer for coverage of ABA treatment, but unlike
Potter, the Court refused to include in the class members of the health
insurance plan that had not filed claims for ABA.124
The Plaintiffs in Churchill charged that Cigna had improperly
denied their claim for ABA treatment125 of autism in violation of ERISA
and thus sought benefits and equitable relief.126 The complaint alleges that
under Cigna’s uniform Medical Coverage Policy, Cigna excluded coverage
of ABA on the basis that such treatment is deemed, “‘experimental,
investigational or unproven’ for the treatment of [autism],” and therefore
122

Id.
Id. On March 30, 2013, the district court issued judgment in favor of the
plaintiff class. Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 10-CV-14981, 2013
WL 4413310, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2013). The Court found that BCBS’
denials were arbitrary and capricious and therefore overturned the denial of
benefits. Id. at *6. The Court remanded the claims for re-administration by BCBS,
stating that “the remand is not an opportunity for BCBS to invent new bases for
denial of claims that were not previously asserted.” Id. at *12-13.
124
Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *1 (E.D.
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011).
125
Id. The original complaint stated that Cigna rejected both ABA and Early
Intensive Behavioral Intervention treatment on the grounds that both treatments
were experimental, however, the Court reasoned that Early Intensive Behavioral
Intervention was encapsulated by ABA and therefore both treatments will be
referred to simply as ABA. Id. at *1 n. 2.
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Id. at *1.
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excluded from coverage.127 Kristopher Churchill, acting as the class
representative, made a motion to certify two subclasses, similar to those
proposed in Potter, under Rule 23(b)(2) and (3).128 The first group, subclass
A, was defined as all insureds enrolled in a plan administered or offered by
Cigna who had made a claim, or will make a claim, for ABA therapy which
was denied, or will be denied, on the grounds that such treatment is
investigative or experimental.129 The complaint also moved to have
subclass B certified as all insured who were enrolled in a plan administered
or offered by Cigna who did not make a claim for ABA therapy in light of
Defendant’s policy that ABA is “deemed to be investigative or
experimental.”130
The Court established that certification could only be granted to an
amended version of subclass A.131 In its reasoning, the Court found that,
although the entire class met the numerosity requirement,132 they failed to
meet the typicality and adequacy of representation standards of Rule 23.133
Under its determination, the Court found that the entirety of subclass A
shared a common question revolving around if Cigna’s denial based on a
claim that ABA therapy is investigative and experimental was a proper
reasoning for denial.134 Therefore, answering a single question, common to
all members of the class, would address the individual claims.135
However, the Court opted to narrow Subclass A in two ways.
127

Id.
Id. at *1-2. Rule 23 (b)(2) states that “a class action may be maintained . . .
if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Rule
23(b)(3) states that “a class action may be maintained . . . if . . . the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
129
Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *2.
130
Id.
131
Id. at *5.
132
The Court determined, based on the size of Cigna’s business coupled with
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First, because Churchill was no longer a member of a Cigna health plan he
could not adequately represent the interests of current members as he
lacked any discernible interest in seeking injunctive relief to prohibit Cigna
from rejecting ABA claims.136 Therefore, the class would have to be
limited to only individuals that were former members of Cigna’s health
insurance plans.137
Second, the Court rejected the reasoning that had been upheld in
Potter, in that the class could not contain individuals who had failed to file
a claim for ABA treatment.138 The Court found the logic of Potter
unpersuasive, stating that individuals may have chosen to not file a claim
for a variety of reasons, not simply because they knew of Cigna’s policy
against ABA reimbursement, and in such cases Cigna’s policy can
therefore not be held to cause harm.139
In the end, the Court chose to certify a class of former Cigna
members that had submitted claims for ABA treatments that had been
rejected by Cigna.140 In doing so, the Court dismissed Cigna’s argument
that it had rejected ABA claims for a variety of reasons, often noted on the
rejection letters sent to plan members. The Court found that, although
Cigna listed a variety of reasons as to why it rejected the claim, including
the argument that there might be differences in diagnoses and the type of
ABA treatment received, Cigna had still made a class-wide determination
that ABA was experimental in all cases and that was the basis for their
continuous rejections.141
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Id. at *4-5. In a subsequent filing the class was amended to capture current
members of the health insurer by adding a second class representative who was
currently enrolled in a Cigna health plan. Churchill II, No. 10-6911, 2012 WL
3590691, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
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Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4-5.
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Id. at *8.
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Id.
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141
Id. at *6. On November 26, 2013 a Notice of Class Action Settlement was
sent to class members. Notice of Class Action Settlement, Churchill v. Cigna
Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 12, 2011), available at
http://www.washingtonautismadvocacy.org/updates/wp-content/uploads/Notice-ofABA-Settlement-Cigna.pdf. The proposed settlement entitled class members to
monetary damages for rejected ABA claims. Id. at 2. A fairness hearing was
conducted on February 19, 2014. Id. at 3. At the time of publication, a final
settlement was not yet approved by the court.
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CONFLICTING RULINGS HIGHLIGHT THE SUBJECTIVE
DETERMINATIONS THAT CREATE THE LEGAL TOOLS
AVAILABLE TO CONSUMERS

While the movement to provide coverage for autism treatment has
made great strides both in law and in the courtroom, many questions
remain. Can you bring a class action against an insurance company to
require coverage for ABA treatment? The answer depends on the district.
Districts following Graddy require individual claims, not class actions,
while districts following Potter and Churchill say certain class actions will
work. Can a certified class encapsulate all members of a plan, or only
those who have filed a claim that was rejected? A judge could find the
presumption that an individual failed to file a claim because they knew of
the insurance company’s policy applicable, while other judges may believe
such a presumption is baseless.
On the face the three class actions look similar. A group of
individuals who could not receive health insurance coverage for autism
treatment, all filing a claim under ERISA to answer a simple question: is a
health insurer’s denial of ABA therapy on the grounds that it is
“experimental” reasonable? However, the judges in these three cases
viewed what was before them in drastically different lights. The
contrasting rulings highlight the problems that arise from a class action
against an insurance company for denial of benefits. Such cases require a
court to rule generally on issues that are very often individual: is this
specific claim covered under this specific policy for this specific
individual?
A. WHAT’S IN A DEFINITION
The first difference can be seen in the class definitions that were
presented for certification. Many may believe that minor differences in
class definitions before the court can explain the conflicting rulings, but the
differences were slight and easily malleable as demonstrated by the
Churchill Court’s willingness to edit the class definition in its
certification.142
In Graddy, the Court rejected the most basic class definition
offered: current and former plan members who had submitted a claim for
ABA therapy and were denied because of the company policy deeming

142

See Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *7.
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ABA therapy experimental.143 Here, the Eastern District of Tennessee
rejected the class on the basis that every class member would require an
“individualized assessment as to the ultimate propriety of the benefits
decision.”144 The Court reasoned that, although ABA treatment is beneficial
to individuals diagnosed with autism, it is not always the preferred and
appropriate therapy, nor is the amount required set in stone. Rather, each
individual diagnosis requires individual review to determine what therapy
is needed, how much, and to what level it should be covered by the health
insurance plan.145
On the other hand, the Potter Court found no such individualized
assessment is required and went so far as to broaden the class definition.
The Court certified a class that contained current and past members of the
health plan who received ABA treatment regardless of whether they had or
had not submitted a claim to the insurer.146 The Court directly disagreed
with Graddy, determining that a company-wide policy deeming ABA
therapy experimental had been applied across the board without individual
assessment of claims, and therefore individual review of the claims, or not
claims, was not necessary. The company policy on its own was at it issue,
and therefore the issue is capable of remedy without individual assessment.
Finally, Churchill was originally presented with the same broad
class definition that occurred in Potter, a class that consisted of current and
former members who had received ABA treatment regardless of if they had
filed a claim.147 Rather than rejecting the class entirely or accepting the
class definition, the Churchill Court opted to apply judicial discretion and
narrow the class definition. In doing so, limited the class to only those
individuals who had made claims to their insurer, finding that such a
definition was apt for class certification.148 The Churchill Court rejected the
reasoning of the Graddy Court.149 Such discretion emphasizes the
uncertainty regarding class actions against insurers and the ability to use
general determinations against a business that relies on individual
appraisals.
143

Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL
670081, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).
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Id. at *9.
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Id. at *10.
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Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL
9378789, at *1, *4 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011).
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Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *2.
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Id. at *8.
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Id. at *8, n. 13.
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B. HOW MUCH, IF ANY, RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE
The second significant difference between the cases rested with
what type of class-wide relief that would be appropriate. In Graddy, the
Court found that the class could not seek injunctive relief under Rule
23(b)(2) because the class’ claim rested on a breach of the fiduciary duty
imposed under ERISA which could only be proven by a clear link between
the breach of duty and the harm experienced. For the Court, such a link
was dependent on the equities of each individual claim, which would in
turn require an individual evaluation of each class member, their diagnosis,
treatment plan, and specific claim. With a lack of homogeneity within the
class, final injunctive relief would not be appropriate for the class as a
whole.150
However, the Potter Court found such reasoning inapplicable, and
determined that not only could the class of current and former members be
extended to include individuals who had not even filed a claim, but also
that they could seek both injunctive and monetary relief.151 For the Eastern
District of Michigan, a class of individuals denied coverage of a specific
treatment, as the result of a company-wide policy are entitled first, to
injunctive relief152 to prevent the company from applying such a policy and
second, to monetary relief153 that would provide reimbursement for their
out-of-pocket expenses.154 The Court held that although individuals would
be entitled to varying amounts depending on their claim, individual
entitlement amounts did not predominate over the fact that all members of
the health plan had been denied benefits solely on the company policy that
deemed ABA therapy “experimental”.155
Finally, in Churchill, the Court walked the line between the
opposing opinions of the earlier courts when it ruled that a class of
individuals who had made a claim for ABA that was denied could not seek
injunctive relief, but could receive monetary relief. The Court found that
the question of what was owed to the consumers turned on the status of the
individuals in the class. Since one subclass contained former members of
the Cigna health plans, injunctive relief was inappropriate because former
150

Graddy, 2010 WL 670081 at *8.
Potter, 2011 WL 9378789 at *9-10.
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members would not be seeking a ruling requiring Cigna to change its
company policy for they would receive no benefit from such a change in
policy.156 However, the other class of current members who had filed
claims could seek monetary damages rather than injunctive relief.
While all three classes commonly sought at least partial relief
under Rule 23(b)(2), the rulings provided three contradictory holdings on
whether such relief is applicable. The competing approaches and reasoning
leave individuals and lawyers without any clear answers. Is a challenge of
an insurance company for an unreasonable denial of benefits available as a
class action, and if it is, what relief can be offered?
VII.

HOW TO APPROACH AUTISM CLASS ACTIONS IN LIGHT
OF AN UNCLEAR PATH FROM THE COURTS

Autism coverage class actions paint a blurry picture at best. The
complicated web of federal and state laws striving to provide autism
coverage is often sidestepped by ERISA’s distinction between insured and
self-insured, leaving plans free to reject claims for treatment. Individual
challenges to these tactics, while often successful, have proven inefficient.
In order to truly clarify answers, the insured have pursued claims
collectively, but even collective action has resulted in three different
judicial approaches. First, courts have determined that individual questions
matter in resolving the reasonableness of an insurer’s decision and
therefore must be reviewed independently.157 Others have found that when
a company applies an across-the-board determination regarding a benefit, a
remedy may also be provided across-the-board.158 Still other courts have
stated that although you may overcome the individualized nature of
diagnosis and treatment plans, you cannot bind people who never acted,
even if they were harmed by the actions of an insurance company.159
Even though the picture is complicated and the precedent
confusing, moving forward courts can apply a standard that allows for
individuals to collectively challenge insurance companies and fill the gap
left by federal and state legislation of autism coverage. Taking into
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Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *6-7 (E.D.
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011).
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Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL
670081, at *9-10 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).
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consideration the requirements and policy basis of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2),160
allowing class actions against insurers best serves the interest of an
efficient judicial system and with proper limitations can strike the balance
of providing global peace to all parties while still allowing for individual
assessments that insurance companies rely on in business.
Determining if an insurance company’s decision to rule ABA
therapy as experimental is reasonable does not require an individualized
assessment of every claim. Rather, the company-wide policy is in
question, not the individual denials; therefore if a court were to determine
reasonableness they would determine an answer to a common question to
all class members. As the advisory committee notes state, “necessity for a
class action is greatest when the courts are called upon to order . . . the
alteration of the status quo in circumstances such that a large number of
persons are in a position to call on a single person to alter the status quo . . .
.”161 Applicable here, the courts are being asked to evaluate the company
policies regarding ABA therapy, rather than each individual rejection of
such a claim. Courts should not be looking at whether every denied claim
was appropriate, nor should they conclude that anyone with an autism
diagnosis is entitled to ABA therapy. Rather, appropriate analysis of the
court should focus on the company policy that hinders millions of
Americans’ access to benefits they need. If autism coverage class action
160

Pertinent subsections are as follows:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only
if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained
if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . .
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . .

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
161
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note.
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claims are accepted by the court as a challenge to insurers’ company-wide
policies rather than individual claims for benefits, a court can sustain a
class certification pursuant to the goals of Rule 23 outlined in the advisory
committee notes.
However, while such questions can be answered for the class, two
distinct limitations discussed in Graddy and Churchill must be established
to ensure uniformity in application and adherence to the requirements and
goals of class actions. First, as the class action jurisprudence stands now,
class actions challenging an insurer’s policy towards coverage of autism
treatment should be limited to injunctive relief. As Rule 23(b)(2) states,
“[when] the party opposing the class has acted . . . on grounds that apply
generally to the class . . . final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate [for] the
class as a whole.”162 Specifically, this has been interpreted to establish two
requirements. First, that the party opposing the class, here the insurers
have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class as
a whole, and second, any final injunctive relief settling the legality of the
behavior is appropriate to the class as a whole.163 Applying such
interpretation here, an insurance company who makes and enforces a
company-wide policy, irrespective of each individual, that deems certain
well-accepted procedures as experimental and thus never coverable, has
acted on grounds applicable to all plan members who sought or are seeking
such treatment and in turn, determination of a court regarding the legality
of such a policy applies generally to the class.
As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he key to the (b)(2) class is
the ‘indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted —
the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared
unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’”164
Under this principle, if the policy is deemed unreasonable, injunctive relief
that prevents them from applying such policy applies generally for the
entire class of effected individuals. A Rule 23(b)(2) class grants members
of an insurance plan the opportunity to collectively challenge insurers on
the limited question of if a policy is reasonable. This allows individuals to
create a stronger driving force based in unity, while still preserving the
right of insurers to make individual assessments. Preventing an across-theboard policy opposing a treatment does not strip from insurers the right to
review claims for treatment and determine if it fits within the plan language
162

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §
4:11 (4th ed. 2002).
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
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and is appropriate. Rather, review of a company-wide policy and its
application prevents an insurer from establishing a policy that unfairly
hurts and impedes the rights of consumers without consideration for the
actual claim, plan language, or any other information relied on by insurers
typically when reviewing a benefit claim.
While our current jurisprudence lays a clear and straightforward
path towards injunctive relief, an area worthy of further exploration is the
potential for success as a (b)(3) class seeking reimbursement. Although
some lower courts have begun to explore reasoning that would support a
(b)(3) class against insurers for claim denials, the success is limited and
Supreme Court jurisprudence signals a pushback. Courts that have
supported (b)(3) classes against insurers first find predominance in the
form of the overriding legal issue of the class, rather than focusing on the
individualized damages that would arise. For example, in Bauer v. Kraft
Foods Global, Inc., a local union and retired employees sued an employer
under ERISA and their collective bargaining agreement because of the
elimination of a health plan and increased cost of prescription drugs.165
The district court reasoned that the “overriding legal issue” presented was
whether the employer’s plan amendments violated the class members rights
generally.166 Since that question predominated and the only subsequent
issue would be damages, certification under (b)(3) was applicable.167
Applied to autism class actions, the overriding legal issue, whether the
insurer’s denial of coverage for autism treatment is reasonable, would
predominate over any other issue presented.
Although such an argument could be made, in order to certify an
autism class action as a (b)(3) class, courts must be willing to view
individualized damages as secondary to the overriding legal issue, thus
maintaining predominance. As such, in order for a (b)(3) class to prevail a
court must accept the argument that while the amount of individual
damages may vary, the formula used to calculate them is consistent across
the board. The Fourth Circuit accepted a similar proposition in Ward v.
Dixie National Life Insurance Co., a class action against insurers claiming
that supplemental cancer insurance policies require payment to the insured
at the rate of the actual charged treatment, rather than the lesser amount
medical providers received from insurers.168 This reasoning is easily
transferable to autism class actions in that the requested monetary damages
165

Bauer v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 558, 558 (W.D. Wis. 2012).
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of the class are simply the cost of treatment not covered by the insurer, a
simple and standard equation for all members of the class.
Despite the fact that the argument may be made in favor of a (b)(3)
class action against insurers, a recent decision of the Supreme Court in
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend raises concerns about the acceptance of such a
“one formula for all” argument.169 While the Plaintiffs in Comcast
developed a formula for damages that incorporated four theories of
antitrust impact, it failed to distinguish which specific theory applied.170
Thus, one segment of the class could have damages based on the theory
that Comcast overcharged because of the elimination of provider
competition, while another segment is entitled to damages because of
Comcast’s increased bargaining power.171 Justice Scalia made clear that,
while a uniform damages equation may exist, one must first ensure that
there is a “translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an
analysis of the economic impact of that event.”172 Under this principle,
concerns about a universal formula for an autism class action may be
raised. Although an insurer has a company-wide policy of denial for ABA
therapy, perhaps even absent such a policy, a claim may still be denied.
For instance, an insured might receive ABA therapy from a non-covered
provider, thus subject to a different reimbursement rate, or conceivably,
although the child is on the autism spectrum, ABA therapy is not the
recommended treatment and thus not covered. Directly contrasted to the
holding in Comcast, while uniform damages may apply, the harmful event
of a company-wide policy does not directly translate to the economic
impact; other factors may also contribute. Under the Comcast precedent
and the shaky ground on which a (b)(3) class for denied insurance claims
rests, this author would hesitate without a clearer showing by the courts to
pursue such a class.
Further, there is concern and caution for a class action seeking
monetary damages for a denial of benefits inherent in the insurance world.
Insurance companies, as part of their business model for assuming risk,
maintain the ability to review claims individually and determine in each
case what is allowed. If a class action were allowed to seek monetary
damages, the individual question of how much each plan member was
entitled to would be answered universally, removing from the insurer the
business right to review the claim. Normally, for an insurer, monetary
169
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relief would involve a close examination by the insurer of the claim, the
policy, the diagnosis, and the treatment plan. A class action would remove
such independent review applied by insurers in all other claims. Therefore,
in allowing the insured to challenge insurance companies as a class action,
they should be limited in injunctive or declaratory relief, which addresses
these concerns and controls the reach of the class action.
Second, in allowing a class action for injunctive relief, the court
must limit the class definition to capture only individuals who are currently
part of the plan regardless of if they have filed a claim or not. As discussed
above, class actions for autism treatment should be limited to seeking
injunctive relief, which sets the foundation for limiting class members to
those currently enrolled in the plan. The claims at issue in these class
actions are similar to issues arising in employment class actions when a
class includes present and former employees. Under such circumstances,
courts have reasoned that only current, and not former, employees would
be affected, meaning the class would no longer fall within the perimeters of
Rule 23(b)(2).173 Past members of an insurance plan cannot share the same
interest as current members in seeking injunctive relief, for past members
would receive no benefit from a ruling that prevents insurers from issuing
uniform rejections of ABA therapy.174 Therefore, if only injunctive relief
class actions are to be certified in regards to autism treatment claims, class
members must be limited to those that would receive actual relief via an
injunction, not open to all those who have been wronged in the past.
Finally, contrary to the rationale applied by Churchill to reject a
broad class encompassing those who submitted claims and those who did
not, the restriction to only injunctive relief claims requires no such
separation. As a result of being restricted to 23(b)(2) classes, any class
action brought before a court would be considered a mandatory class and
therefore, regardless of a claim’s status, all members of the plan and the
173

2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:32 (5th ed.
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highest amount of monetary relief possible, not injunctive relief from which he
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class would receive the same relief. A ruling that prevents an insurer from
applying a company-wide policy prohibiting coverage of ABA therapy
because of experimental status would have the same benefit for all insured.
Whether they filed a claim or not, the insurer would no longer be allowed
to enforce the policy that prevented coverage and all individuals would be
free to submit claims as they see fit.
Churchill’s final paragraphs sufficiently outline why a broad class
approach is unpersuasive, stating a presumption that all insured failed to
submit a claim based on the insurance providers company policy to deny
ABA coverage is impractical.175 As the Churchill Court found, there are a
“multitude of reasons why a beneficiary might fail to file a claim,” and
depending on the situation, the insurer’s policy designating ABA therapy
experimental would not be the actual cause of harm to the individual.176 By
limiting remedies in these class actions a court removes the need to
determine the motivations of each class member. While there still remains
a “multitude of reasons why a beneficiary might fail to file a claim,” such
considerations no longer warrant examination by the courts to determine
appropriate remedies.177
Although judicial precedent has done little to pave a clear path for
autism treatment class actions against insurers, future class certification and
class action claims can be better analyzed. Consideration can be given to
the three recent holdings of Graddy, Potter, and Churchill, but the
approach that will best serve individuals and insurers finds its base in no
single case. Individuals should be empowered to unify in challenges
against their insurers when denied autism treatment coverage but within
limits that respect and preserve insurers’ autonomy to maintain
individualized review.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

With state laws unable to reach self-insured plans and federal laws
failing to address the gap of required coverage that results from ERISA
preemption provisions, it is unlikely we will see a decrease in courtroom
battles for treatment coverage. While individual claims will undoubtedly
continue, the recent showing of three class actions focused on the same
175
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question, presents the court system with a new challenge: establishing an
understanding of the extent to which class actions can be brought to
challenge insurers’ practices. With a complicated web of state laws,
federal regulations, and unclear judicial precedent, the court system must
seriously examine its approach to complicated class action lawsuits. In
doing so, one must look no further than the most recent class certification
rulings, which, although contradictory, can serve as a patchwork for future
court decisions.

